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Developing countries diﬀer from developed countries in diﬀerent aspects. In this paper
we focus on the behavior of ﬁscal variables, sovereign interest rate spreads and default
risk in emerging market economies. Whereas in most middle and low income economies
government spending appears to be highly procyclical, i.e., government spending rises in
economic expansions and falls in recessions, in industrialized countries it usually presents
an acyclical behavior. Evidence on the cyclical properties of the ﬁscal position suggests
that it is procyclical in developing economies. Additionally, the inﬂation tax tends to
accelerate in recessions, which is associated with ﬁnancial crises. In advanced economies
the opposite happens, the inﬂation tax increases when output growth is high. Therefore,
whereas in the developing world ﬁscal policy has been procyclical, the opposite holds in
developed countries. A procyclical ﬁscal policy implies higher (lower) public spending
and lower (higher) tax rates in good (bad) times.
Developing economies also have more volatile business cycles and are more crisis
prone than developed economies. In the last two decades they have experienced several
episodes of sovereign default, some of the most recent cases being Ecuador in 1999,
Argentina in 2001 and Uruguay in 2002 among others. Sovereign default usually takes
place in bad times when output growth is low or even negative. In addition, these
countries face countercyclical interest rates in international credit markets (external
credit is more expensive in bad times) which is tightly linked to countercyclical default
risk.
In this paper we rationalize these stylized facts on ﬁscal variables, interest rates
and default risk of emerging market economies documented in the empirical literature
1and we analyze the links between these variables by developing a quantitative dynamic
stochastic model of a small open economy with endogenous ﬁscal policy, endogenous
borrowing constraints and endogenous default risk.
In the model economy there are households, a domestic government and foreign
lenders. Households value private consumption, public spending and leisure. Public
spending provides direct utility to the private sector, which prefer a smooth path of
public spending over a volatile one. The government collects consumption taxes from
households and borrows abroad to ﬁnance public expenditures. Markets are incomplete
since the only asset available to the government is a non-contingent one period bond.
Sovereign debt contracts are unenforceable, the government has the option to default
on the outstanding debt every period. Foreign lenders charge a risk premium that
accounts for the default risk they face, hence interest rate spreads reﬂect the sovereign
default risk. Since the repayment of non-contingent loans is more costly in recessions,
the incentives to default are higher in bad times. Thus, in recessions the government
faces higher interest rate spreads due to higher default risk and ﬁnds it optimal to rely
more heavily on taxation to ﬁnance public expenditures. However, in expansions the
marginal cost of international credit is lower so there is an increase in ﬁnancing through
borrowing, while taxes play a lesser role. Thus, tax rates are procyclical. Additionally,
since the one period non-contingent bond is not a good instrument for consumption
smoothing purposes, the government is not able to smooth public spending, so public
expenditures are highly procyclical. Therefore, the government optimally implements a
procyclical ﬁscal policy.
In this sense, our paper studies the dynamic interaction between endogenous ﬁs-
cal policy and other key macroeconomic variables such as sovereign debt ﬁnancing in
2emerging economies. The dynamics of taxation, public expenditures, default, interest
rate spreads and international capital ﬂows in the model are derived as an equilibrium
result from the interaction between the domestic government, the private sector of the
small open economy and lenders in international credit markets.
In a quantitative analysis, we calibrate the model to the Argentinian economy1.
Results show that the calibrated model mimics all the empirical regularities described
above for emerging economies.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides the link to the literature; the
economic environment and the theoretical model are presented in Section 3, the equi-
librium is deﬁned in Section 4, the quantitative implications of the model are analyzed
in Section 5 and the conclusions are presented in Section 6. The algorithm is described
in the appendix.
2. Link to the Literature
The empirical regularities for emerging economies addressed in this paper are well doc-
umented in the literature. Gavin and Perotti (1997) (from now on GP) ﬁnd that ﬁscal
policy is procyclical in Latin America, i.e., that it tends to be expansionary in good
times and contractionary in bad times. Talvi and Vegh (2000) (from now on TV) argue
that far from being a particular feature of Latin American countries, procyclical ﬁscal
policy appears to be the norm among developing economies. More recently, a study
by Kamisky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) (from now on KRV) reviews the empirical ev-
idence on the procyclicality of macroeconomic policy analyzing countries grouped by
1In December 2001, Argentina defaulted on its foreign debt and fell into a deep economic crises. This
is the major case of sovereign default in recent history. Thus, most of the recent quantitative papers of
sovereign default focus on Argentina.
3income levels. They ﬁnd that OECD countries seem to implement either countercycli-
cal or acyclical ﬁscal policies. However, consistently with previous studies, they observe
that ﬁscal policy appears to be predominantly procyclical in low and middle income
countries.
TV are among the ﬁrst to document that public spending is highly procyclical in
the developing world and acyclical in the G-7 economies. Subsequent empirical studies
(Braun (2001), Lane (2003), and others) ﬁnd similar evidence supporting the procyclical
behavior of government expenditures in developing countries.
GP observe that while governments in developed economies rely mostly on direct
taxation for revenues, Latin American countries depend heavily on non tax revenues and
indirect taxes (including taxes on international trade), i.e., taxes on goods and services.
Indirect taxes account on average for almost 55% of total tax revenues in the region and
show an upward trend, and international trade taxes account for 16%.
There is no readily available data on the behavior of tax rates over the business
cycle. However, casual evidence from developing countries strongly suggest that tax
rates are procyclical in these economies. Consider for example the cases of Mexico
and Argentina in 1995. These economies were in the middle of a recession and both
governments implemented a contractionary ﬁscal policy. Tax rates were increased and
public expenditures were reduced in both countries. In addition, GP argue that inﬂation
has had a close link with ﬁscal policy in Latin America. While acknowledging that
inﬂation may have been in part the endogenous result of ﬁnancial crises associated with
large ﬁscal imbalances, they point out that ﬁscal deﬁcits in Latin American economies
have been associated with subsequent increases in inﬂation. This suggests the presence
of ﬁscal dominance since inﬂation has acted much more like an instrument of ﬁscal policy
4in these countries compared to developed economies. Thus, in this context they analyze
the cyclical properties of the inﬂation tax. GP ﬁnd that the inﬂation tax is low in good
times and high in bad times. In sharp contrast to the evidence for developing economies,
Cooley and Hansen (1995) have found that in advanced economies the inﬂation tax tends
to increase during expansions and fall during recessions.
The documented procyclicality of ﬁscal policy in most developing countries is in
opposition with the normative ﬁscal policy prescriptions. Keynesian models imply that
ﬁscal policy should be countercyclical. In good times, the government should reduce
public expenditures and increase tax rates. In bad times the government should do the
opposite. In contrast, neoclassical models of ﬁscal policy inspired in Barro (1979) implies
that ﬁscal policy should remain basically neutral over the business cycle. Therefore, if
governments followed the Keynesian prescription, ﬁscal policy would be countercyclical.
On the other hand, if governments followed the prescription from tax smoothing models,
ﬁscal policy would be acyclical.
What explains the procyclical character of ﬁscal policy in most developing coun-
tries? Several explanations have been advanced in order to explain the procyclicality
of ﬁscal policy, including weak political institutions, incomplete markets and borrowing
constraints.
Lane and Tornell (1999) argue that in economies without strong legal and political
institutions a "voracity" eﬀect may take place. In good times a windfall in ﬁscal revenues
intensiﬁes the struggle for public resources. Every interest group tries to get its share
without completely internalizing the eﬀect on general taxation. As a result, a more
than proportional rise in public spending is observed. Talvi and Vegh (2000) develop
a model that includes a political distortion, which increases the cost of running ﬁscal
5surpluses during economic expansions. In this model, the government cuts tax rates in
good times in order to avoid spending pressures. Alesina and Tabellini (2006) explain
the prociclicality of ﬁscal policy with a political agency model. Voters observe output
accurately but not the rents appropriated by corrupt governments. In good times, voters
demand more public goods or lower taxes as they anticipate that, otherwise, windfall
revenues will be wasted by corrupt governments.
Riascos and Vegh (2003) develop a neoclassical model of ﬁscal policy in which public
consumption provides direct utility to households. The government optimally chooses
both the level of public consumption and the tax rate. They show that, with com-
plete markets government consumption is acyclical. They also consider the incomplete
markets case, where the only asset available to the economy is risk-free debt. With
incomplete markets the government is less able to smooth its consumption and the cor-
relation between output and public consumption becomes positive. They suggest that
the lack of complete markets in developing countries might be an important determi-
nant of the cyclical properties of government spending in these economies. However, the
government can commit to pay its debt, so it faces the same interest rate across states.
Since the government always borrows at the international risk free rate, the model is
not able to generate a negative correlation between output and tax rates.
Besides documenting the cyclical properties of ﬁscal variables in Latin American
economies, GP stress the role of borrowing constraints in explaining the procyclicality
of ﬁscal policy in these countries. They argue that governments in Latin America face
a loss of access to external credit markets during bad times, which makes it extremely
diﬃcult to implement either a countercyclical or an acyclical ﬁscal policy. GP present
some evidence that international credit constraints are more severe during recessions.
6Although these constraints cannot be observed directly, they infer their presence from
the use of IMF emergency credit, which is usually provided when there are no other
sources of ﬁnancing. They ﬁnd that the use of these credits is more frequent in bad
macroeconomic times. However, GP only emphasize the role of borrowing constraints
without developing a theoretical model.
Aizenman, Gavin and Hausmann (2000) construct a two period model in which the
government can either tax households or borrow from abroad to ﬁnance an exogenous
amount of public goods. The government can default on its debt and a large recession
forces it to its credit ceiling, resulting in a complete loss of market access, in which case
the government is forced to increase taxes to ﬁnance its expenditures.
This paper considers a quantitative dynamic stochastic small open economy model
with endogenous ﬁscal policy and default. The paper is specially related to the recent
literature of quantitative models of sovereign debt. Following the seminal theoretical
model on international lending and sovereign default by Eaton and Gersowitz (1981)
and the more recent quantitative analysis on unsecured consumer default by Chaterjee,
Rios-Rull et.al. (2002), quantitative models on sovereign default starting by Aguiar
and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2006) and followed by Cuadra and Sapriza (2006),
Lizarazo (2006) and Yue (2006) among others have analyzed diﬀerent features of the
dynamics of emerging market sovereign debt crises. However, these studies do not
analyze ﬁscal policy.
As far as we know, this paper presents the ﬁrst eﬀort to explain the procyclical behav-
ior of ﬁscal policy in developing countries using a quantitative model of sovereign debt
and default in an incomplete markets framework. In addition, the model helps to clarify
several aspects of the explanation based on the tightening of borrowing constraints in
7bad times. Some authors have interpreted it as a full cut oﬀ from international credit
markets during recessions. In this sense, TV criticize this explanation arguing that
developing countries do not always lose accesst of o r e i g nb o r r o w i n gd u r i n gr e c e s s i o n s .
In our paper the government only defaults when the recession is suﬃciently large and
the government is already highly indebted. In such scenario, the country is temporarily
excluded from external markets and public expenditures have to rely on taxes. It is
important to notice that although defaulting is more tempting in bad times, an adverse
shock does not always induce the government to default on its foreign debt. When the
government faces a negative shock and does not default, it has the option to borrow
from abroad, though at a high interest rate. Since the cost of external loans increases
in recessions, ﬁnancing public expenditures with foreign debt becomes a relatively less
attractive option. Thus, the possibility of default, and the associated risk premium
in an incomplete markets setting, is the major factor that induces a procyclical ﬁscal
policy. In this context, the countercyclical behavior of interest rates in the model is con-
sistent with the empirical evidence from emerging markets. Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
and Uribe and Yue (2004) have documented that the cost of foreign credit is higher
in recessions than in expansions. The fact that sovereign spreads are higher in bad
macroeconomic times is closely linked to the default probabilities that foreign lenders
perceive from these economies. Empirical studies have estimated these probabilities,
ﬁnding that incentives to default are higher in recessions2. Cantor and Packer (1996)
have found that sovereign credit ratings, which are valuations on the probability that a
borrower will pay back its debts, strongly respond to the GDP growth rate.
2See Peter (2002) for a survey on econometric studies of the probability of sovereign default.
83. The Model
We consider a small open economy model with three agents: households, government
and foreign lenders. Households have preferences over private consumption, public
spending and leisure. They work and consume, taking as given what the government
does. Households produce goods using labor as an input and the production function
is subject to technology shocks. The government cares about households and seeks to
maximize their utility. It borrows from abroad, taxes households and ﬁnances public
expenditures. Markets are incomplete since the only asset traded in international credit
markets is a one period non contingent bond that is available to the government3,w h i c h
is the only domestic agent that is able to borrow and lend4. Debt contracts are not
enforceable since the government has the option to default on them. When it defaults,
it is temporarily cut oﬀ from credit markets and the economy suﬀers an output loss.
Foreign lenders charge a premium to account for the probability of not being paid back
by the government.
3.1. Households
There is a representative household with preferences given by the present value of the




βtU(Ct,G t,1 − lt) (3.1)
The per period utility is concave, strictly increasing and twice diﬀerentiable. The dis-
3This assumption is not too strong given the fact that emerging markets usually have depended on
short term ﬁnancial instruments.
4Most external debt in developing countries represents government debt. For example, as of March
2003, government debt accounts for almost 70% of the total stock of foreign debt in Argentina.
9count factor is β ∈ (0,1) and households derive utility from private consumption, public
expenditures and leisure. Let Ct represents private consumption, Gt public spending
and lt the amount of time allocated to produce goods. Output is produced using labor
services and the production technology is subject to productivity shocks.
yt = AtF (lt)
where At represents the productivity factor which is assumed to follow a Markov
process, with Q(At+1|At) denoting the Markov transition function for A.T h u s , t h e
productivity factor assumes discrete values deﬁned over the set Υ. Output can be
divided between private and public consumption.
The government implements a tax on private consumption5 and it has two instru-
ments to ﬁnance its expenditures: the proceeds from taxation and external borrowing.
The representative household takes public expenditures and taxation as given and makes
private consumption and labor decisions, subject to the following budget constraint:
(1 + Tt)Ct = AtF (lt) (3.2)
where T is the tax rate on private consumption.
From households’ ﬁrst order conditions we get the following equation, which de-
scribes households’ optimal behavior.
Ul (C,G,1 − l)




5As mentioned before, GP observe that Latin American countries depend heavily on non tax revenues
and indirect taxes, i.e., taxes on goods and services.
103.2. Government
The benevolent government maximizes the utility of the households in the economy.
The government can participate in international credit markets where it can lend and
borrow. Financial markets are incomplete since the government can only save and indebt
itself by selling and buying a non contingent one period bond. In order to ﬁnance its
expenditures, the government has two options, it can either borrow from abroad or tax
households through a consumption tax.
Each period, the government has the option to choose between honoring its outstand-
ing foreign debt or defaulting on it. This decision comes from comparing the net beneﬁts
of the two options, the government makes an optimal comparison between the cost of
temporary exclusion from credit markets given by the foregone beneﬁts of consumption
smoothing and the output loss in autarky, against the direct costs of repayment given
by the short-run disutility of repaying the non contingent loan.
The intertemporal problem of the government is expressed in a recursive dynamic
programming form. Conditional on having access to credit markets, the government has
to decide whether to default or not; if default is not optimal then it has to decide how
m u c hb o r r o w i n go rs a v i n gt od oa n di t sﬁscal policy, i.e., the amount of public expen-
ditures and the level of the consumption tax. If default is optimal then the government
only has to decide its ﬁscal policy. All these decisions are made given the productivity
shock and the amount of outstanding foreign assets it has. Thus, the state variables are
the productivity factor A, the level of foreign assets B and the credit situation of the
country d,w h e r ed =1if the economy has access to credit markets and 0 if the country
is in ﬁnancial autarky.
The value function when the government has access to international markets and
11begins the period with an amount of assets B and shock A is given by V0(B,A).T h e
government has to decide between honoring its debt and defaulting on it, by comparing
the value associated with paying back and remaining in the credit market V c(B,A),
with the value associated with defaulting and going to temporary autarky V d(A).T h e











1 if V c(B,A) >Vd(A)
0 otherwise
(3.4)
The default policies determine a repayment set Γ(B);t h i si sd e ﬁned as the set of
values of the productivity shock such that repayment is the optimal decision given the
l e v e lo ff o r e i g na s s e t sB,
Γ(B)={A ∈ Υ : D(B,A)=1 } (3.5)
and a default set z(B) deﬁned as the set of values of the productivity shock such that
default is optimal given asset holding level B,
z(B)={A ∈ Υ : D(B,A)=0 } (3.6)
If the government does not default, it can issue new debt and ﬁnance its expenditures
according to the following restriction:
G = TC+ B − q(B0,A)B0 (3.7)
where q(B0,A) is the price of the bond that pays one unit of consumption goods the
following period if the government does not default on its debt. When the government
12borrows, it sells bonds to foreign lenders, this transaction implies that the government
receives q(B0,A)B0 units of consumption goods from foreign creditors on the current
period and promises to pay B0 units next period conditional on not defaulting.
In a similar way, when the government lends, it buys bonds from foreign creditors. If
the government purchases a bond of value B0, this transaction implies that the govern-
ment lends q(B0,A)B0 units of the good to foreign creditors and it will receive B0 units
the following period. When foreign creditors borrow from the domestic government it
is assumed that they always pay back, thus only the government is not able to commit
to repay its debt. Hence when the government issues bonds, the price of them reﬂects
the probability of default, so the price depends on B0 and on A since the incentives to
default depend on these factors.
The government’s decision problem when it has access to credit markets is to choose
the tax rate, public consumption and foreign assets in order to maximize households’
utility, taking into account how the private sector will respond to these policies. For-
mally, the government maximizes utility subject to households’ budget constraint and
the private sector’s ﬁrst order conditions, as well as its own budget constraint.
Thus, the problem of the government when it has access to credit markets is:










G = TC∗ + B − q(B0,A)B0




Ul (C∗,G,1 − l∗)
Uc (C∗,G,1 − l∗)
13where C∗ and l∗ represent the optimal choice of private consumption and labor eﬀort
made by households, given the government’s policies (i.e., C∗ and l∗ solve the house-
holds’ ﬁrst order conditions and budget constraint, given the policies implemented by
the government: T, G,a n dB0).
When the government defaults on its debt the country is temporarily excluded from
international credit markets6. In addition, the economy suﬀers an output loss7,s ot h a t
with the same amount of labor services households produce less goods. The productivity
factor in autarky is represented by h(A). The problem is:


































d represents the optimal consumption and labor decisions when the coun-
t r yi si na u t a r k y . T h et a xo nc o n s u m p t i o ni st h eo n l yi n s t r u m e n tt oﬁnance public
expenditures.
If the economy is excluded from credit markets, in such a case the following period
the country may regain access to external markets, where µ denotes the exogenous
probability of reentering ﬁnancial markets. When the economy returns to ﬁnancial
markets, it does so with no debt burden, B =0 , so foreign lenders forgive debt for the
6When the Government defaults, the country goes to autarky. However, the following period it
returns to credit markets with a positive probability. The probability of redemption is calibrated such
that the country stays in autarky three years on average.
7The assumption that default reduces output can be rationalized by the common view that after a
default episode there is a disruption in foreign trade, Rose (2003), which induces an output loss.
14domestic government. In this case the continuation value for party 1 will be V0(0,A 0).
On the other hand, with a probability 1 − µ the country will stay in autarky. In such
a case, the continuation value for party 1 will be V d (A0).
3.3. Foreign Lenders
T h e r ei sal a r g en u m b e ro fi d e n t i c a l ,i n ﬁnitely lived foreign creditors. Each lender
can borrow or lend resources at the risk free rate rf and participates in a perfectly
competitive market to the small open economy.
The individual lender is risk neutral and maximizes expected proﬁts, which are given
by the following equation







As it was pointed out by Cole and Kehoe (1996), the assumption of risk neutrality
of lenders captures the idea that the analysis considers that compared to international
credit markets, the domestic economy is small.
The ﬁrst term of the equation above shows that when creditors lend to the gov-
ernment in the current period, they buy the discount bond issued by the domestic
government at a price q. Next period the lenders may receive the face value of the bond
depending on whether the government defaults or not. When it defaults, creditors get
0 units of the consumption good, where λ(B0,A) is the endogenous probability that
the government defaults on its sovereign debt. Therefore, with probability 1−λ(B0,A)
lenders will be paid back an amount B0
Since there is perfect competition in the credit market, a zero proﬁt condition for
the foreign creditor is satisﬁed.





Thus, the equilibrium bond price q(B0,A) reﬂects the probability of default of the





so that the default probability is zero when z(B0)=∅ and it is one when z(B0)=Υ.
4. Equilibrium
4.1. Deﬁnition
In equilibrium households choose optimal private consumption and labor eﬀort given
government policies and the government determines its optimal default policy and asset
holding policy as well as its optimal ﬁscal policy subject to the private sector optimizing
and foreign lenders optimizing by satisfying their zero proﬁt condition from the debt
contract.
Deﬁnition 4.1. A recursive equilibrium for this small open economy is characterized
by
1. A set of value functions V0,Vc and V d for the government,
2. A set of policy functions for household’s consumption C∗, C∗
d and household’s
labor supply l∗, l∗
d,
8Alternatively, we could assume that foreign lenders have access to two instruments: a risky bond
and a risk free bond. Since creditors are risk neutral, they are willing to buy the risky asset as long as its





163. Policy functions for government’s default decision D, optimal asset holdings B0,
optimal government expenditures G, Gd and optimal tax rates T, Td,
4. A bond price function q,
such that
1. Given the government policies and the bond price function, the household policies
for consumption and labor solve the household’s problem,
2. Given the bond price function q and the optimal policies for households, the
government’s value functions V0,Vc and V d and its policy functions D, B0, G and
T solve 3.3, 3.8 and 3.9:
3. The equilibrium bond price q(B0,s) is such that all agents in the small open
economy are optimizing and international lenders get zero expected proﬁts.
4.2. First Order Conditions from Government’s Problem
The ﬁrst order condition for the consumption tax rate simpliﬁes to:
Uc (C,G,1 − l)
AF (l∗)
(1 + T)











This condition can be interpreted in terms of marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs
of changing the tax rate. In terms of eﬀects on today’s utility, a marginal increase
in the tax rate aﬀects private consumption, public spending and labor eﬀort. The
government increases taxes and reduces the consumption of private goods in
AF(l∗)
(1+T)2
units, which would reduce today’s welfare. On the other hand, the government can






∂T units, increasing household’s welfare.
The ﬁrst term in this expression corresponds to the resources reallocated from private
consumption to public consumption. However, if households react working less hours
when the government implements a higher tax rate, then the amount of resources that
can be assigned to public expenditures would be reduced. This eﬀect corresponds to
the second term.
The Euler equation for the government is obtained from the ﬁrst order condition of
its dynamic optimization problem and the envelope theorem:
Ug (C,G,1 − l)
∙












C0,G 0,1 − l0¢
Q(A0/A)
The Euler equation is interpreted in terms of marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs
of additional lending or borrowing. We consider the case where the government is a net
debtor and the marginal beneﬁts and costs can be described as follows:
In terms of eﬀects on current welfare, for each unit of additional borrowing the gov-






Borrowing from international capital markets implies issuing bonds and additional bor-
rowing would aﬀect the amount of resources available to ﬁnance public spending. Since
the government is borrowing more it could aﬀord a higher level of public expenditures,
in principle it could increase public consumption in q units, but at the same time if the
government is already indebted, additional borrowing would increase the interest rate
that it faces in international markets. As it was explained before, default probabili-
ties are increasing in foreign debt, so if the government wants to borrow more, foreign
lenders would require a higher risk premium. The decrease in the bond price implies
18that the government is not getting as many resources from selling bonds as it would
get if the bond price were constant. Therefore, when evaluating the beneﬁts and costs
of additional external borrowing, the government takes into account the fact that is-
suing more bonds would decrease the price, this eﬀect correspond to the term B0 ∂q
∂B0.
Although the country is small, the government’s borrowing can aﬀect the idiosyncratic
bond price that it faces: if the government issues additional bonds, default probabili-
ties will be higher and foreign creditors will demand a lower price, otherwise they will
not buy the bonds. In addition, extra borrowing might aﬀect the labor supply and
the level of output. If households responded supplying less labor then, for a given tax
rate, the proceeds from taxing households would be lower. Thus, the resources available
for ﬁnancing public consumption would be reduced. However, this eﬀect depends on
the sign of ∂l




∂B0. Nevertheless, increasing B0
can only be optimal if it allows the government to increase G,i no t h e rw o r d sw h e n





∂B0 is positive. In this case the extra resources are used to rise
public spending, thus today’s utility goes up. Next period, the government would have
to repay its debt, which reduces future government consumption. However, it only pays
back when it is optimal, so households only end up enjoying less public goods in those
states where the government does not default and honors its debt.
5. Quantitative Analysis
The model is solved numerically and the parameters are based on existing data and
empirical work on emerging markets. Argentina is used as a benchmark as it represents
the mayor case of sovereign default in recent history. However, many of the business
cycles features observed in Argentina have been present in several emerging market
19economies as well, Aguiar and Gopinath (2004). Given the availability of data on
private and public consumption, the period of study starts in 1993.
5.1. Data
The data are seasonally adjusted quarterly real series obtained from the Ministry of
Economy and Production (MECON) of Argentina. The interest rate spreads for Ar-
gentina are the Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI)9. Output, private consumption
and public consumption are in logs and the trade balance is presented as a percentage of
GDP. All series are ﬁltered with the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. Table 1 shows the business
cycle statistics for Argentina.
With regard to the default rate, in the case of Argentina, Beim and Calomiris (2000)
report three episodes of sovereign default in the last two hundred years, one during
the nineteenth century and two during the twentieth century. In addition, Argentina
defaulted one more time in 2001. Thus, it has defaulted four times in approximately
two hundred years, implying a default rate of 2%10.
5.2. Calibration
The calibration involves choosing the functional forms and the parameter values. The
parameters are chosen based on existing empirical work on emerging markets, if avail-
able. Otherwise they are set to mimic empirical regularities of emerging markets.
The per period utility function of households is speciﬁed as
9The serie for the EMBI for Argentina starts in 1994.
10If we assume that after a default episode countries stay in autarky three years on average and we
exclude these years from the calculation of the default rate, then we would get a rate of 2.13%.










The ﬁrst part of the per period utility has the GHH (1988) speciﬁcation, which has the
property that the marginal rate of substitution between private consumption and labor
is independent of consumption. Therefore, labor supply does not depend on the level
of consumption and its elasticity is equal to 1
Ψ. In addition, public expenditures and
private variables, i.e. C and l, are separable.
Household produce goods using a linear technology, where labor is the only input.
AF (l)=Al.
Given these preferences and technology, and combining the ﬁrst order condition of
household’s problem and her budget constraint, the following expression is obtained for








Household’s labor supply depends on the productivity factor, the tax rate and the
parameters of the per period utility, Ψ. A higher tax on consumption reduces the
optimal level of labor, whereas a positive productivity shock increases it.
T h ep r o d u c t i v i t ys h o c ki sa s s u m e dt of o l l o wa nA R ( 1 )p r o c e s s
ln(At)=ρln(At−1)+εt.




21There is an output loss in autarky, i.e., households produce less goods with the same
amount of labor services. The productivity factor in autarky h(A) is speciﬁed as φE (A)
with φ ∈ (0,1) following Arellano (2006). The parameters for the model are shown in
table 2. Some of the parameter values that are used are standard for business cycles
models in emerging markets. The parameter σ,t h ec o e ﬃcient of relative risk aversion,
is set equal to 2, a standard value (see Aguiar and Gopinath 2006). The parameter Ψ
is set to 0.455 following Mendoza (1991). This parameter determines the labor supply
elasticity, which equals 1
Ψ.
The discount factor β is set at 0.95. One weakness of quantitative models of sovereign
default is that they require a high level of impatience to generate default in equilibrium,
so low values of the discount factor are employed to match the default rates. Aguiar
and Gopinath (2006) and Yue (2006) use values of 0.80 and 0.74 respectively. In this
paper a more reasonable value for the discount factor is used.
The parameter of the cost of default φ, is calibrated to match the risk free debt
limit in emerging markets. According to Reinhart, Rogoﬀ and Savastano (2003) safe
external debt to GDP thresholds for emerging economies appear to be as low as 15 to 20
percent of GDP. In the calibrated economy, the government does not have any incentive
to default, and it faces risk free interest rates, for values of foreign debt up to 0.1093
units of goods. In terms of foreign debt-GDP ratio, this amount corresponds to 14.03%
( 20.70% ) of GDP when the productivity factor takes its highest ( lowest ) value.
The parameter µ reﬂects the exogenous probability of reentering international capital
markets after default and it is set equal to 0.1. This value implies that a defaulting
country will return to ﬁnancial markets in about 10 quarters after defaulting on its
foreign debt. This is in line with the exclusion period observed in the data by Gelos
22(2003), who calculated the average number of years that a country was excluded from
international ﬁnancial markets to be close to 3 years for countries that defaulted on
their foreign debt during the period 1980 - 1999.
The risk free interest rate is set equal to 1%, which corresponds to the US quarterly
interest rate and the parameters of the stochastic process for the productivity factor
were set to match as closely as possible the observed cyclical properties of GDP in
Argentina: the autocorrelation and standard deviation of the Argentinian output. In
addition, the ﬁrst order autoregressive process is approximated by a discrete ﬁrst order
Markov chain with 25 values using Hussey and Tauchen’s (1991) procedure.
Finally, given the values of the parameters, the preferences, which are speciﬁed in
equation 5.1, allow the model to generate a public spending - private consumption
ratio equal to 22%, which is close to the mean value for Argentina. During the period
of study, from 1993 to 2005 this ratio ﬂuctuated between 18% and 23%.
5.3. Results
The simulation results and the statistical properties of the model are presented in this
section. Table 3 shows the business cycle moments of several macroeconomic variables
for the simulated small open economy. Business cycles statistics are average values over
1000 simulations of 50 realizations each, drawn from a stationary distribution. The
simulated series are logged and ﬁltered.
The model economy is able to match several stylized facts in emerging markets:
Incentives to default are higher for highly indebted countries, default risk and interest
rates are countercyclical, public and private consumption are positively correlated with
output, tax rates increase in recessions and fall in expansions and the trade balance
23is negatively correlated with output, the country borrows more in good times at lower
interest rates.
Figure 1 shows the default region for the calibrated economy, i.e., the combinations
of productivity shocks and foreign debt levels for which default is the optimal decision.
Given a shock, if default is optimal for a certain foreign assets level, it will be optimal for
all lower levels of assets. In the same way, if repayment is optimal for a given amount
of assets, it will be optimal for all higher levels of assets. Thus, for each realization
of A, default incentives are stronger for highly indebted governments, since given A
the repayment of the outstanding debt is more costly the higher the amount of foreign
debt. Analytically, this result is derived from the fact that the value of paying back and
staying in good credit standing is strictly increasing in foreign assets, while the value of
defaulting and going to autarky does not depend on the amount of foreign assets. Thus,
if default is the optimal decision for some level of assets B given A, then the value of
staying in the contract is lower than the value of defaulting. A higher amount of foreign
assets increases the value of the contract without aﬀecting the value of default. Thus,
for each value of A there exists a threshold B∗ (A) for which the value of not default is
equal to the value of default. For all levels of assets higher than B∗ (A) the government
optimally honors its debt. Figure 2 shows the value function of the government when
it has the option to default or repay, given three values of the productivity shock. As
we can see, a lower value of A increases the level of assets at which default is optimal,
B∗ (Ahigh) <B ∗ (Alow).
Figure 3 plots the discount bond price schedule as a function of assets for the highest
and lowest values of the productivity shock, as well as the bond price for the middle
value of the shock. As the ﬁgure shows, given a particular shock, bond prices are an
24increasing function of foreign assets. For small levels of foreign debt, the government
always pays back its debt, so it borrows from international markets at the world risk
free interest rate. In this range of debt, bond price is simply the inverse of the gross risk
free rate. However, as foreign debt goes up, at a certain debt level bond prices start to
decrease. The higher the levels of foreign debt the lower the bond prices because the
incentives to default are stronger for large indebted governments. At suﬃciently large
debt levels the government always defaults regardless of the productivity realization. At
that point bond prices are zero since the probability of default is one. However, these
values are not observed in the simulated economy, since a bond price equal to zero does
not occur in equilibrium.
In addition, the bond price schedules also indicate that for all levels of debt, the
government faces lower discount bond prices (higher interest rates) when the economy
is hit by an adverse productivity shock. This result is due to the asset structure of
the model, where there is only one asset, a one period non contingent bond. Given
this market structure, defaulting on foreign debt is more attractive in bad times when
output is low since the repayment of non contingent loans is more costly in recessions.
Since productivity shocks are persistent, lending resources to the government in times of
low output involves a higher default risk. Thus, risk neutral lenders are willing to lend
resources to the government by charging a higher interest rate. The simulated sequence
plotted in Figure 4 shows how the interest rate spread increases as output contracts in
the economy.
The consumption tax and output are negatively correlated, implying that in bad
times when the government has limited access to international credit markets it taxes
more heavily on consumption in order to get resources to ﬁnance its expenditures. On
25the other hand, in good times when foreign credits are cheaper, the government ﬁnances
its expenditures mainly through external borr o w i n g .T h u s ,t h ef a c tt h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n t
is not able to commit to repay its debt induces a procyclical tax rate. Figure 5 shows
the dynamics of GDP and tax rates in one simulation of the model economy.
In bad states of nature, the government relies more on taxes for the following reason.
As mentioned before given the asset structure of the model, default is more tempting
in recessions. Thus, if the government defaults then it is the case that an adverse
shock has hit the economy. Therefore, in the middle of a recession, a highly indebted
government losses access to credit markets and it has to ﬁnance its expenditures with
taxes. However, if the productivity shock is low but the government is not highly
indebted then it might ﬁnd optimal to pay back and remain in international markets.
Nevertheless, since the productivity shock is persistent a bad shock today implies a
higher probability of having a bad shock tomorrow. Thus, the lower the productivity
shock today the higher the default risk for a given amount of external borrowing. In this
sense, even if the government does not default it faces higher interest rates in bad times,
which implies that using external debt to ﬁnance public expenditures is a relatively less
attractive option. Thus, the government ﬁnds it optimal to rely more heavily on taxes
when ﬁnancing public expenditures.
Figure 6 presents the tax policy function T(B,A) as a function of B for three values
of the productivity shock. When the amount of foreign debt is low and the government
always pays back its debt, the country faces the risk free interest rate and the optimal
tax rate increases with the value of A. However, when foreign debt is high enough such
that asset positions are carrying a positive risk premia, the optimal tax rate decreases
when a positive productivity shock occurs. When the country is in autarky, the tax rate
26falls since the government only has to collects tax revenues to ﬁnance its expenditures,
without having to make payments to foreign lenders.
In the same way, public spending is procyclical since it is valued by households and
markets are incomplete. The only asset in the economy is one period non contingent
bond. Since default is more attractive in bad times, it is the case that the bond price is
low in recessions and high in expansions. The asset structure in the model and the coun-
tercyclical interest rates reduce the ability of the government to smooth consumption.
Thus, both public and private consumption are highly correlated with output.
Finally, the trade balance is countercyclical in the calibrated economy, the country
borrows more in good macroeconomic times at lower interest rates. The availability
of external credit and the interest rate vary with the business cycle. Foreign lenders
r e s p o n dt oa ni m p r o v e m e n t i nt h ed o m e s t i c macroeconomic conditions by demanding
a lower risk premium. Given the lower cost of foreign borrowing, the government views
this as a good opportunity to ﬁnance expenditures cheaply and thus dissaves. Addi-
tionally, productivity shocks are persistent. If the economy is hit by a positive shock
today then the probability of having good shocks in the future increases. The perspec-
tive of having a higher income tomorrow also induces the government to borrow more.
Figure 7 shows the borrowing policy function B0(B,A) conditional on not defaulting, as
a function of B for three values of the productivity shock. When the country is highly
indebted, the government clearly borrows more in booms than in recessions.
6. Conclusions
We develop a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model of a small open economy that helps
rationalize several stylized facts that are present in emerging market economies. Our
27model features an endogenous ﬁscal policy in an incomplete credit markets framework
where the country has the option to default on its sovereign debt. In our paper the
government only defaults when the recession is suﬃciently large and the government is
already highly indebted. In that case the country is temporarily excluded from external
markets and public expenditures are ﬁnanced by taxation. Although defaulting is more
tempting in bad times, an adverse shock does not always induce the government to
default on its foreign debt. When the government faces a negative shock and does not
default, it has the option to borrow from abroad, though at a high interest rate. Since the
cost of external loans increases in recessions, ﬁnancing public expenditures with foreign
debt becomes a relatively less attractive option. Thus, complementing the previous
literature that focused on the loss of market access, we ﬁnd that the possibility of
default and the associated risk premium play an important role in inducing a procyclical
ﬁscal policy. In addition, since the non-contingent bond is not a good instrument for
consumption smoothing purposes, the government is not able to smooth public spending,
so public expenditures are highly procyclical. Therefore, the government optimally
implements a procyclical ﬁscal policy. The model also generates countercyclical interest
rate spreads and trade balance as well as procyclical private consumption.
287. Appendix
7.1. Algorithm
From the ﬁrst order condition of the household’s problem and her budget constraint,







this expression is plugged in 3.2 and 3.7, to get the following expressions for private









w h i c ha r ep l u g g e di n5 . 1 :











Assume an initial function for the price of the bond q0(B0,A) as well as initial values
for V0 and V d. To calculate the initial value of the bond, use the inverse of the risk
free rate. For the initial values of the value functions, (V0)0 and (V d)0, start with 0
matrices, then the following algorithm is used:
1. Use q0 to get G0 from 7.1, then for every point ( A, B,a n dB0 ) ﬁnd the value of
the tax rate, T0, that maximizes 7.2.
2. Use q0 and T0 to express the per period utility 7.2 as a function of B, B0,a n d
A,t h e nu s e( V0)0 and (V d)0 and equations 3.3, 3.8 and 3.9 to get (V0)1,( V d)1,t h e
29policy function, B0(B, A) and default function D(B, A)a sw e l la st h eo p t i m a lt a xr a t e
associated with A, B and B0(B, A).
3. Given the default function D(B, A), and the repayment and default sets Γ(B) and
z(B), compute the probability of default λ(B0, A)u s i n g3 . 1 1 .




5. Use the updated price of the bond q1 and the value functions (V0)1 and (V d)1 to












max{(V0 (B,A))0 − (V0 (B,A))1} < 
max
n
(V d (A))0 − (V d (A))1
o
< 
where   is a small number
307.2. Derivation of First Order Conditions
The representative household maximizes 3.1 subject to 3.2, taking as given the govern-
ment policies. From 3.2 we get an expression for private consumption, then we plug it
into the household per period utility. The ﬁrst order condition with respect to l is:
Uc (C,G,1 − l)
∂C
∂l
= Ul (C,G,1 − l),
Uc (C,G,1 − l)
AFl (l)
(1 + T)
= Ul (C,G,1 − l). (7.3)
Plugging the government budget constraint, equation 3.7, into equation 7.3 and
solving for l, we get the decision rule for labor supply l∗ as a function of the government
policies, T and B0, as well as the state of the economy, A and B. From the expression
for private consumption we can also express the decision rule for private consumption







If we plug l∗ and C∗ into the government budget constraint, we get the following





+ B − q
¡
A,B0¢
B0 − C∗ ¡
A,B,T,B0¢
. (7.5)
In order to solve the government problem, we plug 7.5 into equation 3.8. Therefore,
the government sets T and B0 to maximize household utility taking as given how the
private sector reacts to the government policies
31From equation 3.8 we get the ﬁrst order condition with respect to the tax rate, when























































































Taking the derivative of 7.5 with respect to C and l,a sw e l la st h ed e r i v a t i v eo f7 . 4
with respect to l, then plugging them into the government ﬁrst order condition for the
tax rate, we get the following expression.
Uc (C,G,1 − l)
AF (l∗)
(1 + T)












































32The ﬁrst term of the above expression corresponds to the ﬁrst order condition from

























Taking the derivative of 7.5 with respect to C, l, q and B0 as well as the derivative
of 7.4 with respect to l, then plugging them into the government ﬁrst order condition














To obtain an expression for ∂V c






































































































The terms multiplying ∂T

























































33The ﬁrst term is equal to the ﬁrst order condition from the household problem,
which is equal to zero and the rest of the terms multiplying ∂B0
∂B are equal to equation
7.7 which is also equal to zero. Finally the derivative of 7.5 with respect B is equal to




Updating the above equation and plug it into equation 7.8 we get the Euler equation
for the government
Ug (C,G,1 − l)
∙
B0 ∂q











C0,G 0,1 − l0¢
Q(A0/A)
347.3. Tables and Figures









Default Rate (%) 2.00
Table 2. Parameter Values
Discount Factor β 0.95
Risk Aversion σ 2
Labor Elasticity 1
Ψ 2.22
Re-entry Probability µ 0.10
Default Penalty φ 0.98
Risk Free Interest Rate rf 0.01
Output Shock ρ 0.90
σ 0.0105








ρ(GDP, Tax Rate) -0.33
ρ(GDP,TB/GDP) -0.34
Default Rate (%) 0.26
Max Tax Rate (%) 24.18
Max Spread (%) 1.15




























Figure 1 Default Region
Default Region
















































































































































Figure 5 Dynamics of GDP and Tax Rate
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